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INTRODUCTION
I trace the origin of my idea for this piece to the 2014 United States
Supreme Court decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.1 The Court had just
decided that a for-profit corporation could exercise religion and therefore
that requiring a corporation to cover the cost of contraception for its
employees violated the corporation’s rights under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.2 The Court’s decision made me wonder about the religious
beliefs of Hobby Lobby’s employees and why the corporation’s “sincerelyheld beliefs” were deemed more important than those of its workers.
Our courts seem willing to throw the weight of the law behind religion
above all else. Just this last year, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
baker in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,
despite the fact that he had violated Colorado’s neutral and generallyapplicable Anti-Discrimination Act (the Act) by refusing to bake a wedding
cake for a gay couple.3 Like others of its kind, the Act was enacted by
Colorado as a remedial measure designed to prevent precisely the type of
discrimination committed by the baker in this case. However, because of a
comment made by one of the members of the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission while adjudicating the baker’s case, the Court concluded that
the Commission had treated the baker unfairly, and had demonstrated
hostility toward his sincerely-held beliefs.4 Therefore, it held that
application of the Act to the baker in this case violated his right to the free
exercise of his religion.5 In Masterpiece, one commissioner’s “disparaging”
comment about the historical use of religion to justify discrimination was
enough to outweigh the state’s interest in preventing discrimination against

1. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
2. See id. at 2785.
3. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n., 138 S. Ct. 1719,

1740 (2018).
4. Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Court Rules (Narrowly) for Baker in Same-SexWedding-Cake Case [Updated], SCOTUSBLOG (June 4, 2018, 2:17pm),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/opinion-analysis-court-rules-narrowly-for-bakerin-same-sex-wedding-cake-case/.
5. Id.
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LGBTQ people.6
Hobby Lobby and Masterpiece Cakeshop highlight current tensions in the
United States between Christian conservative groups and proponents of
reproductive rights and LGBTQ rights.7 A prominent example of this
conflict is when medical providers refuse to provide certain types of
healthcare based on their religious beliefs. Providers and institutions are
given broad leeway for such refusals under what are commonly known as
“conscience clauses” codified in state and federal laws.8 Under many such
conscience exemptions, entire hospitals, healthcare systems, clinics, or
practice groups may refuse to provide treatment, information, or even
referrals to patients based on the religious beliefs of the institution’s owners
or governing body.9 These conscience exemptions almost exclusively
protect institutions or individuals who disapprove of various types of
reproductive healthcare (or other healthcare, such as certain end-of-life
decisions).10 The laws generally do not protect the religious values of
doctors like Dr. Willie J. Parker, for example, who believes that he has a
moral, ethical, and religious obligation to provide abortions.11 They also do

6. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723, 1729, 1740. The commissioner
pointed out that “[f]reedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of
discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the
[H]olocaust . . . we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has been
used to justify discrimination,” and stated that “to [him] it is one of the most despicable
pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion to hurt others.” Id. at 1729;
see also Howe, supra note 4.
7. See generally Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014
U. ILL. L. REV. 839 (2014) (describing the “culture wars” between conservative religious
leaders and individuals advocating in favor of contraception, abortion, and same-sex
marriage, and proposing possible solutions).
8. See Sarah M. Stephens, Freedom from Religion: A Vulnerability Theory
Approach to Restricting Conscience Exemptions in Reproductive Healthcare, 29 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 93, 101 (2017). For example, in January 2018 the Health and Human
Services Department proposed a new rule that would dramatically expand existing
religious refusal provisions in a range of federal laws governing healthcare. See 83 Fed.
Reg. 3880 (proposed Jan. 26, 2018) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88).
9. Stephens, supra note 8, at 106.
10. Id. at 111.
11. Id. (citing Willie J. Parker, Why I Provide Abortions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/18/opinion/why-i-provide-abortions.html).
There is one federal statute, known as the Church Amendment, that does prevent medical
facilities receiving certain federal funds from discriminating against an individual who
provides (or refuses to provide) abortions. See Steph Sterling & Jessica L. Waters,
Beyond Religious Refusals: The Case for Protecting Health Care Workers’ Provision of
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not protect the religious values and moral decision-making of the individuals
seeking healthcare.
If the law is to shield religious beliefs closely and aggressively, it must do
so in an even-handed way, rather than simply codifying certain well-known
beliefs of majority religions.12 In our current public discourse, religion has
become almost synonymous with political conservatism and the backlash
against the sexual revolution.13 However, many Americans of all political
persuasions are guided by deeply and sincerely-held moral, ethical, and
religious beliefs, which have largely been left out of the religious freedom
conversation.
As a Jew, Atheist, and Feminist, the Hobby Lobby decision led me to
serious consideration of what protection the Constitution (or other laws)
would provide for the moral and ethical beliefs that guide my own life. I
sought to engage in a genuine discussion of what “religious freedom” should
look like in an increasingly secular age.14 For many women I know,
Feminism provides a central set of values that do indeed guide their lives like
a religion. In this Article, I argue that those beliefs should be protected like
any other religion under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Section I of this article outlines the legal definition of religion used by
United States courts. Section II defines Feminism, and gives a brief history
of Feminism in the United States. Section III demonstrates how Feminism
fits within each of the legal definitions of religion. Section IV provides
examples of religious rights claims that might be brought by Feminists.
Finally, Section V considers the problem of conflicting religious liberties,
and proposes possible solutions.

Abortion Care, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 463, 487-88 (2011).
12. This Article suggests that we reexamine the wisdom of allowing seemingly
endless exemptions for religion in the law.
13. See Laycock, supra note 7, at 839.
14. According to the Pew Research Center, people who are religiously “unaffiliated”
make up the third-largest “religious” group in the world. PEW RESEARCH CTR, THE
CHANGING GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 8 (2017), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/11/2017/04/07092755/FULL-REPORT-WITH-APPENDIXESA-AND-B-APRIL-3.pdf. And while the United States remains relatively religious, my
generation is considerably less religious than the generation before us. PEW RESEARCH
CENTER, RELIGION AMONG THE MILLENNIALS 1 (2010), http://assets.pewresearch.
org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2010/02/millennials-report.pdf.
Academics
have
addressed the propriety of special religious liberties protections in a society with many
nonbelievers, and have suggested that at the very least nonbelievers must be “integrated
into the system of religious liberty.” See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 7, at 876.
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DEFINING RELIGION

This section first explains the United States Supreme Court’s definition of
religion. Next, it outlines the definition of religion used by several United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals. Finally, this section gives examples of nontraditional and non-theistic religions that have been recognized by the courts
as qualifying for religious freedom protections.
A. The Seeger and Welsh Definition of Religion
The Supreme Court addressed the question of what constitutes religion in
several cases decided in the 1960s and early 1970s. In Torcaso v. Watkins,
decided in 1961, the Court struck down a Maryland statute requiring
individuals to declare their belief in the existence of God in order to hold
public office.15 While the Court did not provide a definition of religion in
Torcaso, the case established two important principles: first, that states
cannot prefer religious believers over non-believers, and second, that the
constitutional definition of religion includes non-theistic beliefs.16
The Supreme Court’s current definition of religion came out of two cases
involving conscientious objectors during the Vietnam War. In United States
v. Seeger17 and Welsh v. United States,18 the Court considered a provision of
the Secret Service Act that exempted from the military draft “those persons
who by reason of their religious training and belief [were] conscientiously
opposed to participation in war in any form.”19 The statute defined religion
as “an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation, but (not including)
essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely
personal moral code.”20 Although Seeger and Welsh were technically cases
of statutory interpretation, they ultimately became constitutional holdings.21
In Seeger, the Court considered the claims of three men who had applied
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

367 U.S. 488, 489 (1961).
See id. at 495.
380 U.S. 163 (1965).
398 U.S. 333 (1970).
Seeger, 380 U.S. at 164-65.
Id. at 165.
See Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 683 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Though it
construed a statute rather than the Constitution itself, Seeger is often read as addressing
constitutional limits inherent in the draft statute; the case is therefore applicable to First
Amendment analysis generally.”); see also Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207 (3d Cir.
1979) (referring to the selective service cases as constitutional cases that addressed the
definition of religion).
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for conscientious objector status and were denied. All three had asserted
beliefs that led them to oppose war, but none professed belief in a “Supreme
Being,” as required by the Secret Service Act.22 Mr. Seeger, for instance,
stated that
He preferred to leave the question as to his belief in a Supreme
Being open, ‘rather than answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’; that his ‘skepticism
or disbelief in the existence of God’ did ‘not necessarily mean lack
of faith in anything whatsoever’; that his was a ‘belief in and
devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious
faith in a purely ethical creed.’ He cited such personages as Plato,
Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his ethical belief in intellectual
and moral integrity ‘without belief in God, except in the remotest
sense.’23
The Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favor of all three Seeger
plaintiffs. In doing so, the Court “embrace[d] the ever-broadening
understanding of the modern religious community.”24 In its opinion, the
Court quoted and discussed a range of writings from a variety of religious
leaders: Protestant theologian, Dr. Paul Tillich; the Bishop of Woolwich,
John A. T. Robinson; the Ecumenical Council; and “a leader in the Ethical
Culture Movement,” Dr. David Saville Muzzey.25 The Court reasoned that
the viewpoints of these leaders “demonstrate[d] very clearly the diverse
manners in which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors,
may be articulated.”26
Seeger recognized the difficulty of crafting a definition of religion that
could encompass such a vast range of beliefs. The Court therefore came up
with an “essentially . . . objective” test to determine whether a particular
belief or set of beliefs constitutes religion: whether “the claimed belief
occup[ies] the same place in the life of the [believer] as an orthodox belief
in God holds in the life of one” clearly asserting religion.27 The Court
emphasized that, “[i]n such an intensely personal area . . . the claim of the
[individual] that his belief is an essential part of a religious faith must be
given great weight.”28 It also noted that “[r]eligious experiences which are
as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others,” and explained
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166-70.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 180-84.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 184.
Id.
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that the appropriate questions were whether a person’s beliefs were
“sincerely held,” and “whether they [were], in his own scheme of things,
religious.”29
In Welsh, a divided Supreme Court applied the Seeger test to a
conscientious objector who himself did not consider his beliefs religious.
Welsh had crossed out the word “religious” on his Selective Service form,
but stated that he “believe[d] that human life is valuable in and of itself,” and
that he therefore would “not injure or kill another human being.”30 Welsh
stated that his belief was “not ‘superior to those arising from any human
relation,’” but was “essential to every human relation.”31 He asserted that he
therefore could not “assume duties which [he felt were] immoral and totally
repugnant.”32
The Supreme Court held that Welsh’s conscientious objector status should
have been granted, even though Welsh himself did not characterize his
beliefs as religious.33 The Court went on to explain that, even if an
individual’s “deeply and sincerely [held] beliefs” were “purely ethical or
moral in source and content,” they would be considered religious if “those
beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that individual a place parallel to that
filled by God in traditionally religious persons.”34 Thus, because Welsh’s
beliefs “function[ed] as a religion in his life,” the Court concluded that he
was “as much entitled to a ‘religious’ conscientious objector exemption . . .
as [was] someone who derive[d] his conscientious opposition to war from
traditional religious convictions.”35
Ten years after Welsh, the Supreme Court in Thomas v. Review Board
provided further support for a broad, nuanced view of religion. Thomas
upheld the right of a Jehovah’s Witness to refuse to work building weapons
because of his religious beliefs.36 The plaintiff in that case was “struggling

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 184-85.
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 343 (1970).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 341 (explaining that “[t]he Court’s statement in Seeger that a registrant’s
characterization of his own belief as ‘religious’ should carry great weight . . . [did] not
imply that his declaration that his views are nonreligious should be treated similarly,”
because most conscientious objectors were likely unaware of the Court’s broad definition
of religion).
34. Id. at 340.
35. Id.
36. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 707 (1981).
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with his beliefs,” and was not able to articulate them perfectly.37 The
plaintiff had shared his concerns with a co-worker and fellow Jehovah’s
Witness, who had advised him that the work in question was not
“unscriptural.”38 Still, Thomas believed that his friend’s view “was based
upon a less strict reading of Witnesses’ principles than his own,” and
nonetheless refused to do the particular work in question.39
In confirming the Thomas plaintiff’s free exercise rights in this
circumstance, the Supreme Court explained that “religious beliefs need not
be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others,” even others
within the same religion, in order to be protected by the First Amendment.40
The Court further stated that courts “should not undertake to dissect religious
beliefs” because the believer might be “‘struggling’ with his position or
because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision that a
more sophisticated person might employ.”41
In sum, as is appropriate in a pluralistic society, Supreme Court
jurisprudence has opened the door for constitutional recognition of a broad
range of religious beliefs and moral codes of conscience. The “central
consideration” as to whether an individual’s beliefs are religious is “whether
those beliefs play the role of a religion, and function as a religion” in the
individual’s life.42
B. The Third Circuit’s Three-Factor Test for Recognizing Religion
The test articulated in Seeger and Welsh for religious beliefs has remained
current since those cases were decided, and is generally followed by the
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Third Circuit, however,
developed what it proposed as a more “objective” test in Malnak v. Yogi,43 a
similar version of which has been adopted by the Tenth Circuit as well.44
Malnak concluded that “the modern approach” to assessing religious
beliefs should “look to the familiar religions as models in order to ascertain,
by comparison, whether the new set of ideas or beliefs is confronting the
same concerns, or serving the same purposes, as unquestioned and accepted
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 715 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 711.
Id.
Id. at 714.
Id. at 715.
See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970).
See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 199 (3d Cir. 1979).
See United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1480 (10th Cir. 1996).
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‘religions.’”45 The court outlined three “useful indicia” that are “basic to our
traditional religions,” and that are “related to the values that undergird the
first amendment.”46 Malnak suggested that these indicia might be used by
courts to assess whether a person’s beliefs are “religious.”
First, the court looked to whether a belief system grapples with and
addresses “fundamental questions” such as “the meaning of life and death,
man’s role in the Universe . . . the proper moral code of right and wrong,”
and other such “imponderable questions.”47 Second, it examined whether
the beliefs have a broad scope and comprehensive answers to ultimate
questions.48 The court explained that, like scientific theories, “moral or
patriotic views are not by themselves ‘religious,’” but that “if they are
pressed as divine law or a part of a comprehensive belief-system that presents
them as ‘truth,’ they might as well rise to the religious level.”49
Third, and finally, Malnak assessed whether the asserted set of ideas has
“any formal, external, or surface signs that may be analogized to accepted
religions,” such as “formal services, ceremonial functions, the existence of
clergy, structure and organization, efforts at propagation, [or] observance of
holidays.”50 The Third Circuit noted, however, that “a religion may exist
without any of these signs,” and thus their absence cannot be determinative.51
Indeed, the court cautioned that its three indicia would be “helpful” to courts
in assessing whether a set of beliefs constitutes a religion, but that they
“should not be thought of as a final ‘test’ for religion.”52
C. Non-Theistic and Non-Traditional Religions Recognized by Courts
Our courts grant protection to “traditional,” theistic religions far more
often and more readily than to minority religions, particularly non-theistic
religions. However, in Torcaso v. Watkins, the Supreme Court recognized,
albeit in a footnote, that religions need not “teach what would generally be
considered a belief in the existence of God” to qualify for First Amendment
protection.53 The Court gave examples of such non-theistic religions,
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See Malnak, 592 F.2d at 207.
Id. at 207-10.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id.
See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961).
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including “Ethical Culture” and “Secular Humanism” among them.54
Further, numerous Circuit Courts of Appeals have recognized that nontraditional and non-theistic religions such as Satanism and Wicca qualify for
protection under the Free Exercise Clause.55 The Eight Circuit found that
white supremacists associated with the Aryan Nation likely qualified for Free
Exercise protections, explaining in its decision that “the fact that the notion
of white supremacy may be, and perhaps usually is, secular . . . does not
necessarily preclude it from also being religious in nature . . . .”56 Finally, in
Kaufman v. McCaughtry, the Seventh Circuit held that atheism qualifies as
a religion under the Free Exercise Clause.57
As demonstrated in this section, the definition of religion used by our
courts is far more expansive than the definition that would commonly be
used by a layperson. Further, the constitutional definition of religion has
been applied to a variety of belief systems not generally thought of to be
religious. Thus, the fact that Feminism is not a traditional or theistic religion
does not preclude its recognition under the Free Exercise Clause.
II. DEFINING FEMINISM
Like the label for any other belief system, the name “Feminism” applies
to a broad range of particular beliefs and practices that stem from the central
idea that men and women are equal and should be treated as such.58 Just as
most established religions have undergone significant changes throughout
history and have broken out into different sects (for example, Christians have
split into Roman Catholics, Protestants, and other denominations), Feminism
has developed over time, and groups of Feminists conceptualize it
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Kunselman v. W. Reserve Local Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 931 (6th Cir. 1995)

(assuming that Satanism is a religion); Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27
F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1994) (assuming that Wicca is a religion); Dettmer v. Landon, 799
F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that witchcraft is a religion).
56. See Wiggins v. Sargent, 753 F.2d 663, 667 (8th Cir. 1985).
57. See Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Atheism is,
among other things, a school of thought that takes a position on religion, the existence
and importance of a supreme being, and a code of ethics. As such, we are satisfied that
it qualifies as [Plaintiff’s] religion for purposes of the First Amendment claims he is
attempting to raise.”). The Supreme Court has also recognized constitutional protections
for atheists under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. This is not
dispositive of its view of Free Exercise claims by atheists, however, because the Court
has held that the Establishment Clause also prohibits the government from favoring
religion over irreligion.
58. CHIMAMANDA NGOZI ADICHIE, WE SHOULD ALL BE FEMINISTS 47 (2015).
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differently.59 Therefore, the Feminist historical events, ideals, and practices
discussed herein are demonstrative, rather than comprehensive or
exhaustive.
For the sake of clarity and comparison, the examples and analysis in this
piece employ a relatively simplistic definition of Feminism, taken from
Feminist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s We Should All Be Feminists: a
Feminist is “a person who believes in the social, political, and economic
equality of the sexes.”60
This section offers a brief history of Feminist movements in the United
States from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. It then describes a
few of the most central beliefs and practices of Feminists.
A. A Brief History of Feminist Movements in the United States
Feminism as we think of it today began in Europe in the late eighteenth
century, marked by literary works such as Mary Wollstonecraft’s 1792 book,
A Vindication of the Rights of Woman.61 Feminism was fostered, in part, by
the French Revolution of 1789.62
The first Women’s Rights Convention in Seneca Falls, New York in 1848
is generally considered to mark the beginning of the organized Feminist
movement in the United States.63 Leaders of the Convention “rewrote the
Declaration of Independence into their own Declaration of Sentiments,
calling for full rights of citizenship for women . . . .”64 The Declaration of
Sentiments demanded equal access to education, jobs, and the right to vote.
The Declaration also demanded that women be paid the same wages as men,

59. See, e.g., Karen Offen, Defining Feminism: A Comparative Historical Approach,
14 J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 119, 123 (Autumn 1988).
60. ADICHIE, supra note 58, at 47.
61. ANTJE SCHRUPP, A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEMINISM 13-17 (2017); Woman’s Rights,
in FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA (2017). [hereinafter Women’s
Rights].
62. Schrupp, supra note 61, at 13, 17.
63. Offen, supra note 59 at 123; see Elle Covington, On Women’s Equality Day, A
Very Brief Timeline of Feminist History in America, BUSTLE (Aug. 26, 2015),
https://www.bustle.com/articles/106524-on-womens-equality-day-a-very-brieftimeline-of-feminist-history-in-america (recognizing that “[w]e generally mark the
beginning of the feminist movement in the United States as 1848,” but extending the
feminist historical timeline to include feminist acts by individual women starting in the
1630s).
64. See generally Covington, supra note 63; see also SCHRUPP, supra note 61, at 2526.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2019

11

American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 27, Iss. 5 [2019], Art. 9

234

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 27

which remains a central goal of the Feminist movement today.65
Scholars have used the metaphor of “waves” to describe different periods
in the history of American Feminist movements.66 While in many ways the
label creates artificial and problematic divisions,67 it can be helpful for
demonstrating the ways in which Feminist beliefs and practices have evolved
over the last two-hundred years.
The first “wave” of American Feminism focused on women obtaining the
right to vote.68 Starting in the late 1800s and early 1900s, a dedicated faction
of American Feminists, known as suffragettes, fought a dramatic battle for
women’s right to vote.69 They picketed the White House, were subjected to
arrest and incarceration, and led prison hunger strikes in support of their
cause.70 Efforts by these suffragettes eventually lead to the ratification in
1920 of the Nineteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which
gave women the right to vote.71
The second “wave” of American Feminism began in the mid-1960s, and
focused on women’s representation in the public sphere and on achieving
legal equality with men.72 During the 1960s, Feminists founded numerous
organizations dedicated to advancing their values in society, including the
National Organization for Women and the National Abortion and
Reproductive Rights League.73 During this time, Feminists also advocated
for the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which sought to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex.74
In 1963, Betty Friedan published her book, The Feminine Mystique, which
described how women “were stifled in the home, undereducated, and treated
as children.”75 In 1968, Alice Walker published her book, The Color Purple,
65. See generally Covington, supra note 63.
66. See Amanda D. Lotz, Communicating Third-Wave Feminism and New Social

Movements: Challenges for the Next Century of Feminist Endeavor, 26 WOMEN AND
LANGUAGE 1, 2-3 (Spring 2003).
67. See SCHRUPP, supra note 61, at 79.
68. Id. at 39.
69. See Women’s Suffrage, supra note 61.
70. See Covington, supra note 63.
71. Id.
72. See Lotz, supra note 66, at 3.
73. Id.
74. See generally Roberta W. Francis, The History Behind the Equal Rights
Amendment, EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT, https://www.equalrightsamendment.org/
history (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
75. See Covington, supra note 63.
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which shared her experience of being a Black woman in a male-dominated
society, and in light of a Feminist movement led and dominated by white
women.76 In 1971, Feminist leader, Gloria Steinem, founded Ms. magazine,
which quickly became a platform for Feminists to spread their ideas to a
wider and more diverse audience.77 And in 1973, after years of advocacy on
the subject by Feminist activists, the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade,
which declared that, because the Constitution includes a fundamental right
to private relationships between patients and doctors, states could no longer
ban abortion.78 The decision marked a significant victory for Feminists, who
believe in women’s right to control their own bodies and reproduction.79
The most recent or current era of Feminism, often referred to as the “third
wave,” began in the 1980s.80 In the 1980s and 1990s, the formally organized
and structured Feminist movement gave way to more individualized
expressions of Feminism.81 Women began defining their own versions of
Feminism within the larger concept.82 The 1990s were marked by women
speaking out about issues that affected them on a personal level and that
collectively hindered women’s fight for equality.83 Anita Hill spoke out
about being sexually harassed by Clarence Thomas, who was nevertheless
confirmed to the Supreme Court in 1991.84 The “Riot Grrrl Manifesto”
began a musical genre that called for the amplification of women’s voices
and addressed issues of violence against women.85 In 1996, Eve Ensler’s
famous Vagina Monologues premiered, and the play would be performed on
college campuses for two decades to follow.86
Beginning around the time of the Roe v. Wade decision, women of color
advocating for reproductive freedom began to identify problems with the
mainstream Feminist reproductive rights movement.87 The “pro-choice”

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 115 (1973).
Women’s Suffrage, supra note 69.
See Lotz, supra note 66, at 3-5.
Covington, supra note 63.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Loretta Ross, Understanding Reproductive Justice: Transforming the ProChoice Movement, 36 OFF OUR BACKS 14, 16 (2006).
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framework focused on the legality of abortion and privacy rights, but did not
address the intersecting issues impacting communities of color.88 Therefore,
women of color developed a new conceptual framework around which to
center their activism: Reproductive Justice.89 Loretta Ross, co-founder of
the Reproductive Justice organization SisterSong, defines Reproductive
Justice as “the complete physical, mental, spiritual, political, social and
economic well-being of women and girls, based on the full achievement and
protection of women’s human rights.”90
Due to these efforts by women and Feminists of color, many third-wave
Feminists have now begun to recognize the intersections of oppression based
on sex, race, socio-economic class, sexual orientation, and gender-identity,
among others.91 As a result, many modern Feminists believe that women’s
liberation must necessarily also include efforts to combat oppression on the
basis of other intersecting identities.92
Feminism has been an established collective system of belief and moral
framework in the United States for over 150 years. While it is true that
individual Feminists conceptualize the belief differently, Feminism has
consistently stood for certain core principles, ideas about right and wrong,
and about how humans should behave toward one another.
B. Core Feminist Beliefs and Practices
First and foremost, Feminists believe that women are equal to men, and
should be treated as such. Feminists have consistently fought for equal pay,
political power, access to education, and equality in domestic life, including
the division of unpaid household labor and child rearing. Bodily autonomy
is also a core Feminist belief, which has manifested itself in different

88. Id.
89. Id.; see also Kimala Price, What is Reproductive Justice? How Women of Color

Activists are Redefining the Pro-Choice Paradigm, 10 MERIDIANS 42, 42 (2010).
90. See Ross, supra note 87, at 14; see also What is Reproductive Justice?,
IF/WHEN/HOW, https://www.ifwhenhow.org/about/what-is-rj/ (last visited July 17, 2018)
(“Reproductive justice will exist when all people can exercise the rights and access the
resources they need to thrive and to decide if, when, and how to create and sustain their
families with dignity, free from discrimination, coercion, or violence.”).
91. See Lotz, supra note 66, at 3; see Ross, supra note 87, at 14 (“One of the key
problems addressed by Reproductive Justice is the isolation of abortion from other social
justice issues that concern communities of color: issues of economic justice, the
environment, immigrants’ rights, disability rights, discrimination based on race and
sexual orientation, and a host of other community-centered concerns”).
92. See Lotz, supra note 66, at 3.
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practices and advocacy efforts. For example, Feminists believe that women
deserve to be free from sexual harassment, unwanted sexual contact, and
should be empowered to choose whether and when to have children—if they
choose to have them at all. This belief in bodily autonomy has led Feminists
to advocate for access to reproductive healthcare including contraception,
abortion, and a range of birthing options.
Like generations of Feminists before them, many third wave Feminists
have committed to living by Feminist principles in a way that permeates their
everyday lives.93 Core Feminist beliefs influence what jobs they take, what
movies they watch, what relationships they enter into, how they raise their
children, and how they behave toward others generally.94 Although
individual Feminists practice differently, and few would characterize it as
such, Feminism qualifies as a religion under First Amendment jurisprudence
because of how it operates in the lives of its adherents.95
III. FOR FREE EXERCISE PURPOSES, FEMINISM IS A RELIGION
Feminism is, for obvious reasons, generally thought of as a social and
political movement, rather than as a religion. However, the Feminist
movement is centered on core principles and ideas about morality and world
order. Feminists attempt to live by a code of conduct that reflects their values
and conforms with guidance from Feminist leaders and teachers. For many
active members of the movement, Feminism involves holidays, rituals, and
gatherings not dissimilar to religious worship.
93. See id. at 6 (explaining that third wave feminism is applied at a personal level,
so the individual is the site of self-determination). Because the legal definitions of
religious belief are dependent on the place a belief occupies in the life of the holder, it is
possible that Feminism might be a religion for some adherents, but not others.
94. For example, many Feminist parents start teaching their children at a young age
about the absolute value of bodily autonomy and the mandate of consent as a prerequisite
for physical contact. See, e.g., Tanya Stabinsky, 12 Ways Parents Can Teach Their
Children Consent, EVERYDAY FEMINISM (Mar. 18, 2016), https://everyday
feminism.com/2016/03/parents-teach-children-consent/. Feminist parents also reject the
notion of gendered toys or clothing, instead leaving the expression of gender identity
fully open to their children. See, e.g., Renee Davidson, Put Down That Barbie! A (NonGendered) Gift Guide for Girls, MS. (Dec. 13, 2012), http://msmagazine.com/
blog/2012/12/13/put-down-that-barbie-a-non-gendered-gift-guide-for-girls/. But see
Heather Wilheim, Get Ready For The Feminist War On ‘Gendered Toys’, THE
FEDERALIST (Dec. 17, 2014), http://thefederalist.com/2014/12/17/get-ready-for-thefeminist-war-on-gendered-toys/ (criticizing Feminist parenting practices).
95. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339-340 (1970) (noting that whether
an individual adherent characterizes her beliefs as religious is not dispositive of whether
those beliefs qualify as such for purposes of the First Amendment).
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Further, regardless of whether Feminism would be considered a religion
under a common understanding or colloquial definition of the concept, it fits
within the more encompassing constitutional definition established by our
courts. Feminism constitutes a religion under the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment using both the Supreme Court’s Seeger/Welsh test and
the Malnak test applied by the Third and Tenth Circuits.
As discussed in Section II, Feminism is like any other religion in that
adherents hold varying beliefs within the framework, and practice their
religion in different manners.96 The Free Exercise Clause protects the beliefs
and practices of individual adherents regardless of whether they are shared
by other members of the same religion.97 This Article does not
unrealistically assume uniform practice among Feminists. Instead, because
application of the Seeger/Welsh test requires examination of an individual
claimant’s beliefs, this section uses the example of one hypothetical
practicing third-wave Feminist, Ruth, to demonstrate the ways in which
Feminism might operate as a religion in the life of one such believer.98
Application of the Malnak test, on the other hand, allows for a more
generalized analysis of Feminism as a whole, in addition to examination of
a specific adherent’s beliefs.
This section first considers Feminism under the Seeger/Welsh test.
Second, it analyzes Feminism using the Malnak test. Third, this section
includes a brief discussion of Feminist Theology as a demonstration of the
religious nature of Feminist beliefs. Finally, this section addresses the
“slippery-slope” argument against recognizing non-traditional notions of
religion under the First Amendment.
A. Feminism Qualifies as Religion under the Seeger/Welsh Test
Our hypothetical Feminist, Ruth, believes that the world will be better
when women are allowed to achieve self-actualization, and are empowered
to participate fully and equally in society. Therefore, she believes that it is
96. See, e.g., ROXANE GAY, BAD FEMINIST xiii (2014) (“We don’t all have to believe
in the same feminism. Feminism can be pluralistic so long as we respect the different
feminisms we carry with us . . . .”).
97. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981) (“[R]eligious beliefs need
not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First
Amendment protection . . . .”).
98. It is also worth noting that a person need not be part of an organized group in
order for her faith to be protected. See Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 593 (7th Cir.
2011). Therefore, even if Ruth’s Feminism looks different from everyone else’s, it may
still qualify for religious freedom protections.
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immoral to limit women to certain prescribed roles, jobs, or activities, and
that to do so denies women’s inherent value and human dignity. Further, she
believes that in order for women to have true agency and ownership over
their lives, they must be able to control their own bodies. Therefore, Ruth
has a near-absolute belief in bodily autonomy. This belief is also shared by
most Feminists and has been preached by many of the most influential
Feminist leaders.99
In Seeger and Welsh, the Supreme Court addressed the particular belief
that caused each plaintiff to object to military service. Under the Court’s
analysis, a person’s belief is religious if it “occupies in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God [in traditionally religious
persons].”100 For example, the Supreme Court found that Seeger’s “belief in
and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes,” which compelled
him to refrain from participating in war, qualified as religious because it
“imposed upon him a duty of conscience” akin to the type that would be
communicated by a Supreme Being in theistic religions.101 Therefore, the
Court found that Seeger’s belief occupied a place in his life similar to that
filled by God in the lives of adherents to traditional religions.102
Similarly, Welsh believed in the inherent value of human life, which
imposed upon him a moral duty to abstain from violence toward another
person.103 He held this belief “with the strength of more traditional religious
convictions,” such that his conscience “would give [him] no rest or peace if
[he] allowed [himself] to become a part of an instrument of war.”104 The
Supreme Court found that Welsh’s objection to war was religious, in spite of
the fact that his beliefs “[had] been formed by reading in the fields of history
and sociology,” and were “undeniably based in part on his perception of

99. See, e.g., Sarah Begley, Gloria Steinem on Playboy, Amy Schumer and When Not
to Vote for Women, TIME (Oct. 27, 2015, 8:28 AM), http://time.com/4085396/gloriasteinem-amy-schumer-playboy-book/; What is Reproductive Justice?, IF/WHEN/HOW,
https://www.ifwhenhow.org/about/what-is-rj/ (last visited July 17, 2018); Wendy Lu, 17
Quotes About Reproductive Rights To Share On Facebook, Because Supporting
Reproductive Health Care Is Everyone’s Responsibility, BUSTLE (Feb. 6, 2107),
https://www.bustle.com/p/17-quotes-about-reproductive-rights-to-share-on-facebookbecause-supporting-reproductive-health-care-is-everyones-responsibility-35427.
100. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
101. See id. at 166, 172.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 343.
104. Id. at 343-44 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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world politics.”105
Ruth’s belief in bodily autonomy qualifies as religious under
Seeger/Welsh. Ruth believes that to deny women bodily autonomy is to deny
them basic human dignity, and views recognition of human dignity as a
moral imperative. Ruth does not view her belief in bodily autonomy as being
dictated by a supreme being. Rather, like Welsh’s religious belief in the
value of human life, Ruth’s belief in the sanctity of women’s bodies and the
moral imperative of bodily autonomy is “not superior to those arising from
any human relation,” but is “essential to every human relation.”106 Thus,
Ruth’s beliefs impose upon her a moral duty to champion women’s equality
and to protect women’s reproductive freedom, among other things.
Further, Ruth’s strong conviction in the moral imperative of bodily
autonomy is part of the broader teachings of Feminism. Although based in
part on her understanding of history, sociology, and world politics, Feminism
“function[s] as a religion” in Ruth’s life.107 Ruth strives to live her life in
accordance with the principles of equality and universal human dignity, and
makes decisions based on guiding Feminist tenets. While this leads Ruth to
certain political positions and actions, it applies to an even greater extent in
her personal decision-making and interpersonal relationships. For example,
Ruth chooses her romantic partners carefully based on whether they will
share her belief in gender equality, reproductive choice, and raising children
without imposing prescriptive gender roles.108
Application to this hypothetical Feminist demonstrates that Feminism
satisfies the Seeger/Welsh test for religion because it imposes moral duties
upon adherents and functions as a religion in the lives of devout believers.
Similarly, as described in the next section, Feminism satisfies the three-part
test established by the Third Circuit in Malnak.
B. Feminism Qualifies as Religion under the Malnak Three-Factor Test
The Third Circuit’s three-factor test focuses on the nature of religious
beliefs, and the issues that they address. First, religions offer guidance on
“[f]undamental and ultimate questions . . . having to do with, among other

105. Id. at 341-42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. See id. 343.
107. See id. at 339 (explaining that the “central consideration” as to whether beliefs

are religious is “whether those beliefs play the role of a religion, and function as a
religion” in the believer’s life).
108. Compare Ruth to someone for whom it is important to marry within his or her
own faith or to raise his or her children in the church.
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things, life and death, right and wrong, and good and evil.”109 According to
the Third Circuit, “above all else, religions are characterized by their
adherence to and promotion of certain underlying theories of man’s nature
or his place in the Universe.”110 Feminism teaches that the subjugation of
women is immoral. According to Feminist teachings, equal treatment of the
sexes accords with the natural and inherent equality of men and women. In
other words, men and women share equal place in the Universe, and “man’s
nature” is no different from woman’s nature. Feminists aim to shed human
constructs such as prescribed notions of gender and sex-based stereotypes
for a more equitable and enlightened existence. Feminists have faith that a
better world will exist when women share equal power with men in all
aspects of their lives.111
Second, “[a] religion is not generally confined to one question or moral
teaching . . . “ but rather is a comprehensive belief system offering answers
to multiple “ultimate questions.”112 At first glance, the simple belief that
men and women are equal might appear to be an “isolated answer,” of the
type not considered to be religious under Malnak. However, from that core
principle springs a myriad of other beliefs and practices, as discussed in
Section II.A. This is particularly true for Feminists whose practice includes
the more encompassing Reproductive Justice framework.113
Finally, the Malnak test considers whether a set of ideas has “any formal,
external, or surface signs that may be analogized to accepted religions.”114
The Feminist movement has comprehensive theologies that have been
109. See Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1033 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Malnak
v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 208 (3rd Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
110. Africa, 662 F.2d at 1033 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It is
somewhat ironic, from the perspective of religious Feminism, that the court’s definition
of religion itself considers “man’s” nature and “his” place in the Universe.
111. The idea of creating a better present world (as opposed to focusing on the
afterlife) is undoubtedly among the chief pursuits of many traditional theistic religions
as well. For example, Judaism teaches that believers are obligated to care for others, to
work toward equal justice for everyone, and “to perfect the world under the rule of God.”
See RABBI JOSEPH TELUSHKIN, JEWISH LITERACY 560-64, 616-18 (rev. ed. 2001) (also
explaining that the afterlife “is rarely discussed in Jewish life”).
112. See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 209 (3d. Cir. 1979).
113. See discussion supra, Section II.A (discussing the Reproductive Justice
movement).
114. See Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209 (“Such signs might include formal services,
ceremonial functions, the existence of clergy, structure and organization, efforts at
propagation, observation of holidays and other similar manifestations associated with the
traditional religions . . . .”).
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developed and written about extensively by Feminist leaders and teachers.
Feminists almost universally recognize certain texts as authorities on
Feminist theology and practice.115 Feminists have also developed a host of
organizations devoted to proselytizing the movement’s ideas.116 Further,
many Feminists commemorate and celebrate significant moments in the
movement’s history, such as the anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Roe v. Wade, the passing of the Nineteenth Amendment, and International
Women’s Day. Individual Feminists like Ruth attend such gatherings with
other Feminists, where they find community, renew their commitment to live
by their beliefs, and give money to organizations championing Feminist
goals.117 Ruth even tries to “convert” members of her own family who
believe in traditional, limiting gender roles, who oppose reproductive
freedom, et cetera. These “surface signs” are sufficiently analogous to those
demonstrated by traditional religions to satisfy the Malnak test.
As a set of beliefs, ideas, and practices, Feminism meets all of the
requirements of, and therefore qualifies as a religion under, the Malnak test.
Because Feminism qualifies as a religion under both the Seeger/Welsh
definition and the Malnak definition, Feminists are entitled to Free Exercise
protections under the First Amendment. The existence of Feminist Theology
lends further support to the conclusion that Feminism qualifies as a religion.
C. Feminist Theology
The religion of Feminism is not an exclusive one; Feminists may also be
members of other faiths.118 The Feminist Theology movement was
115. See, e.g., Lauren Hubbard, 20 Essential Feminist Books to Read for Women’s
History Month, HARPERS BAZAAR (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.harpersbazaar.com/
culture/art-books-music/g19412213/best-feminist-books-every-woman-must-read/.
116. See, e.g., Susy Chavez Herrera, Reproductive Justice Organizations Demand an
End to Trump’s ‘Zero-Tolerance’ Policy, REWIRE (Jul. 9, 2018, 9:42am),
https://rewire.news/article/2018/07/09/reproductive-justice-demand-an-end-to-trumpszero-tolerance-policy/ (including a list of Reproductive Justice organizations as cosignatories); see also Hadley Mendelsohn, 8 Women’s Rights Organizations Everyone
Should Know About, MYDOMAINE (May 18, 2018) https://www.mydomaine.com/
womens-rights-organizations (discussing several prominent Feminist organizations).
117. Such Feminist gatherings can be analogized to church services in which churchgoers find community with other like-minded individuals, renew their faith, and give
money to their church.
118. The author would suggest that this quality is not as unique as we might suppose.
While many devout religious believers would assert that religion is not “a buffet” from
which beliefs may be picked and chosen, in reality, many individuals ascribe to some
religious beliefs outside of their own particular faith organization or sect.
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developed within religions such as Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, and
Islam by adherents who wanted to reconsider the traditions, practices,
scriptures, and theologies of those religions from a Feminist perspective.119
As one leader of the Feminist Theology movement characterized it,
[t]he critical principle of feminist theology is the promotion of the
full humanity of women. Whatever denies, diminishes, or distorts
the full humanity of women is, therefore, appraised as not
redemptive. . . . The uniqueness of feminist theology is not the
critical principle, full humanity, but the fact that women claim this
principle for themselves.120
The promotion of the full humanity of women is the central purpose of all
Feminism.121 The fact that Feminist Theology actively forces traditional
theistic religions to reconcile with the core tenets of Feminism evidences the
essential nature of the questions being addressed by Feminism generally, and
its importance in the lives of adherents. In this way, the emergence and
evolution of Feminist Theology supports the conclusion that Feminism is
religious in nature.
D. Addressing the “Slippery Slope” Argument
As demonstrated in Sections III.A and B, Feminism fits within the broad
constitutional definition for religion. Still, such a result is likely to give rise
to a “slippery slope” counterargument, which might go something like this:
if we recognize as religion what has historically been classified as purely a
social or political movement, what is to stop people from asserting all kinds
of political opinions or secular world views as religion when benefits them
to do so? There are a few responses to this argument.
First, it is important to keep in mind that when assessing religious freedom
claims, courts examine the sincerity of the claimant’s belief, as well as the
role that the belief plays in her life. In Callahan v. Woods, the Ninth Circuit
directly addressed the concern that “[a] person seeking to advance a secular
interest might, if frustrated in his pursuit, decide to mask the cause in

119. See generally STANLEY J. GRENZ & ROGER E. OLSON, 20TH-CENTURY
THEOLOGY: GOD & THE WORLD IN A TRANSITIONAL AGE (1997); see also Lisa
Isherwood, The Embodiment of Feminist Liberation Theology: The Spiralling of
Incarnation, 12 FEMINIST THEOLOGY 140 (2004).
120. Denise Ackermann, Feminist Liberation Theology: A Contextual Option, 62
J.THEOLOGY S. AFR. 14, 14-28 (1988) (citing R. R. REUTHER, SEXISM AND GOD-TALK
165 (1983)).
121. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 87, at 14.
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religious garb in order to bring it under First Amendment Protection.”122
Callahan pointed out that it is the job of trial courts to assess a claimant’s
testimony, and if her asserted beliefs are found to be insincere, to rule “[her]
claims entitled to no special privilege.”123
Second, the slippery slope problem is already implicated by existing
religious freedom jurisprudence and by the nature of religious belief in
general. The courts have conceded that moral, patriotic, or political beliefs
may nonetheless be religious. In Welsh, for example, the Supreme Court
agreed that Welsh’s opposition to war “was undeniably based in part on his
perception of world politics.”124 Nonetheless, it held that a person’s deeply
held beliefs should not be excluded from protection merely because they are
“founded to a substantial extent upon considerations of public policy.”125
Similarly, although a belief that is based on “purely secular
considerations” will not be protected by the Free Exercise Clause,126 where
a belief is both secular and religious, the First Amendment “presumably
protects the area where the two overlap.”127 In Wiggins v. Sargent, for
example, the Eighth Circuit entertained the Free Exercise claim of a member
of the Aryan Nation, and rejected the trial court’s conclusion that “since the
notion of white supremacy [is] secular, it could not also be religiously
based.”128 Further, according to at least one Circuit Court, the First
Amendment protects a belief that was purely secular when it arose, but which
later takes on a religious significance in the life of the believer.129
Given that the law already recognizes such a broad and individualized
definition of religion, the idea that Feminism qualifies as such does not raise
a new slippery slope argument, but merely highlights an already-existing
one. Rather than artificially limiting the definition of religion, which would
undoubtedly result in further marginalization of minority religions, the better
122.
123.
124.
125.

See Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 684 (9th Cir. 1981).
Id.
See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342 (1970).
See id. at 342-43. The Court distinguished those whose opposition to war rested
on “moral, ethical, or religious principle” from those whose opposition rested “solely
upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency,” and classified the latter as
falling outside the scope of protected beliefs. Id.
126. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
127. See Wiggins v. Sargent, 753 F.2d 663, 666–67 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing Callahan
v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 684 (9th Cir. 1981)).
128. See id. at 666-67.
129. See Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679,684-87 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejecting the idea
“that a long-held secular belief invalidates First Amendment protection for a related but
newly-alleged religious belief”).
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approach would be to limit the extent to which religion may be used as a
shield against otherwise neutral laws promoting the general welfare.
There is, of course, much more to be said on this topic, which is beyond
the scope of this Article. However, the proposed solution is simple enough:
personal practice of religion is an essential liberty interest, and should be
treated as such. But religion should not be allowed to expand so far beyond
the personal that it becomes a tool for believers in traditional, majority
religions to flout the laws, social norms, and expectations that govern our
society—particularly at the expense of adherents of minority religions or of
nonbelievers.
IV. RESPECTING THE FREE EXERCISE OF FEMINISM
A broad range of circumstances might implicate the constitutional Free
Exercise rights of Feminists. Additionally, if Feminism is a religion under
the Constitution, it almost certainly qualifies under statutes such as the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which establish heightened
protections for religious practice beyond those of the Free Exercise
Clause.130 This section highlights several examples of situations in which a
Feminist might assert a religious freedom claim either under the Constitution
or relevant statute.
Many religious freedom cases involve claims by incarcerated persons that
their right to practice their religion has been infringed upon by prison
policies. Incarcerated individuals generally enjoy less protection of their civil
liberties than free persons.131 RLUIPA, however, states that “no government
shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a[n
incarcerated] person . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, unless the government demonstrates that . . . the burden on that

130. See generally Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that where a
neutral law of general applicability infringes on the free exercise of religion, the law need
only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest in order to pass constitutional
muster); Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993) (applying only
to the federal government and restoring the “compelling interest” strict scrutiny test that
had been applied before Smith to religious freedom claimants “whose religious exercise
[was] substantially burdened by government”); Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc (2000) (applying strict scrutiny to land use and prison
regulations that “impose[] a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person”).
131. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (holding that prison regulations
infringing on constitutional rights are valid if they “are reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests”).
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person” satisfies strict scrutiny.132 RLUIPA defines “religious exercise”
broadly to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or
central to, a system of religious belief.”133 This definition suggests at least
as inclusive a definition of religion as would be used under the First
Amendment. Courts have also applied RLUIPA to several non-traditional
religions, including a whites-only religious group134 and a pagan inmate.135
One of the central tenets of Feminism is the right of women to control their
bodies, and their reproduction in particular. This belief is evident in Feminist
efforts to protect women’s access to safe and legal abortions. While under
the Fourteenth Amendment states may not enact laws that create an “undue
burden” on free women’s right to access abortion, many prisons and jails
have healthcare policies that all but prohibit women from obtaining
abortions, except in extremely limited circumstances.136 Courts have
generally analyzed challenges to restrictive prison policies regarding
abortion under the Eighth Amendment right to healthcare for incarcerated
persons.137 However, for Feminists with a deeply held belief in bodily
autonomy, access to abortion is a matter of religious practice. Therefore, an
incarcerated Feminist being denied access to abortion could also bring a
claim under the First Amendment or RLUIPA.
Similarly, Feminists outside the prison context could challenge laws
restricting access to abortion under the federal RFRA or analogous state laws
that have been passed in over twenty states. RFRA prohibits the government
from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability” unless the government’s
action is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental

132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
133. Id. § 2000cc-5. The text of RLUIPA states that it “shall be construed in favor of

broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of
[the statute] and the Constitution.” Id. § 2000cc-3.
134. See Murphy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 372 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2004), cert.
denied 543 U.S. 991 (2004).
135. See Coronel v. Paul, 316 F. Supp. 2d 868, 869-70 (D. Ariz. 2004).
136. See Incarcerated Women’s Abortion Access Limited by Varying Policies and
Practices, GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar. 9, 2009), https://www.guttmacher.org/newsrelease/2009/incarcerated-womens-abortion-access-limited-varying-policies-andpractices (citing Carolyn B. Sufrin, et al., Incarcerated Women and Abortion Provision:
A Survey of Correctional Health Providers, 41 PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6
(2009), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pubs/psrh/full/4100609.pdf.
137. See Angela Thomas, Note, Inmate Access to Elective Abortion: Social Policy,
Medicine and the Law, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 539, 555 (2009).
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interest.138 Therefore, even if a restriction on abortion access would
otherwise be a neutral law of general applicability, and therefore not
actionable under the First Amendment, a Feminist could challenge the law
under RFRA as substantially burdening the exercise of her religion.
Feminists might also bring religious freedom claims challenging federal
policies such as the Hyde Amendment, which was passed in 1976 as a direct
reaction to the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision.139 The Amendment prohibits
federal funds, such as Medicaid funding, from being used to pay for
abortion.140 While individuals have no constitutional right to receive
government benefits such as Medicaid, the government may not administer
its benefits programs in a manner that violates the Constitution.141 Therefore,
the government’s standard for providing Medicaid funds for low-income
individuals’ healthcare may not single out or exclude from coverage specific
care in a way that discriminates against or limits the free exercise of religion.
If Feminism qualifies as a religion, the Hyde Amendment would be akin to
prohibiting Medicaid funding to cover bloodless medicine for Jehovah’s
Witnesses.
These examples demonstrate just a few of the ways in which Feminists
might assert their right to religious freedom; undoubtedly there are countless
other possible examples.
V. ADDRESSING CONFLICTS WITH OTHER RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
In the decades since Roe v. Wade was decided, Feminist beliefs have
increasingly come into conflict with the beliefs of conservative religious
groups and institutions, such as the Catholic Church.142 These tensions have
138. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (2014) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(a)).
139. See Hyde Amendment Codification Act, S. 142, 113th Cong. (2013); Alina
Salganicoff, et al., The Hyde Amendment and Coverage for Abortion Services, HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION: WOMEN’S HEALTH POLICY (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/perspective/the-hyde-amendment-andcoverage-for-abortion-services/.
140. Salganicoff, supra note 139 (stating that the amendment includes limited
exceptions for when continuing the pregnancy would endanger the woman’s life or when
the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest).
141. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407-10 (1963) (holding that the state had
violated the Free Exercise Clause when it denied unemployment benefits to a Seventh
Day Adventist who had been fired for refusing to work on his Sabbath).
142. See Laycock, supra note 7, at 871 (describing religious backlash against the
sexual revolution in the United States and ongoing conflicts between political liberalism
and religious groups such as the Catholic Church).
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been exacerbated since the 1993 passage of RFRA, which has been wielded
by religious opponents of abortion, contraception, and same-sex marriage as
legal protection for practices that discriminate against women and LGBTQ
people.143 Additionally, religious institutions, such as Catholic hospitals,
have invoked RFRA and state “conscience clauses” when refusing to provide
women with birth control or abortion care, and when refusing to abide by
individuals’ end-of-life wishes.144
Sections I.B and II.A, have identified the importance of bodily autonomy
as a central Feminist belief, and have suggested that accessing birth control
and abortion is one way in which Feminists exercise their religion. Making
autonomous decisions about death and dying with dignity, including the
decision to seek physician aid in dying,145 might be another exercise of the
religious belief in absolute bodily autonomy. The question that follows then
is what happens when the religious freedom claims of respective parties
come into conflict with one another.
Because the First Amendment only protects free exercise of religion from
government interference, conflicts between religious believers only
implicate constitutional rights when one or both parties involved in the
conflict seeks the government’s help to assert their religious freedom rights.
For example, religious individuals and groups frequently ask the government
to exempt them from laws that are otherwise applicable to everyone.146
However, in some circumstances allowing for such an exemption might
result in a burden on the free exercise of another’s religion.
This section first addresses conflicts between the religious rights of
individuals and those of organizations and institutions. Second, it considers
143. See id. at 845.
144. See Maxine M. Harrington, The Ever-Expanding Health Care Conscience

Clause: The Quest for Immunity in the Struggle between Professional Duties and Moral
Beliefs, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 780-82 (2007), https://scholarship.law.tamu.
edu/facscholar/78; Stephens, supra note 8, at 98-103; Judy Stone, Refusal (Conscience)
Clauses—A Physician’s Perspective, FORBES (Jan. 22, 2018, 7:00am), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/judystone/2018/01/22/refusal-conscience-clauses-a-physiciansperspective/#502b28834181.
145. Also commonly referred to as “physician-assisted suicide.”
146. See, for example, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n,
138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723-24 (2018), in which a baker argued that he was entitled to a
religious exemption from Colorado’s generally-applicable anti-discrimination law, and
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014), in which a craft
store chain argued that it was entitled to an exemption from the birth control mandate
applicable to all non-religious employers because of the religious convictions of its
owners.
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conflicts between the religious rights of individuals.
A. Conflicts with the Free Exercise Rights of Institutions
The Supreme Court case Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos presents an example of
how the religious rights of institutions may come into conflict with the rights
of individuals. Amos involved a challenge to Section 702 of the Civil Rights
Act, which exempts religious organizations from the Act’s prohibition on
religious discrimination in employment.147 The exemption was designed to
protect the “autonomy” of religious organizations, thereby safeguarding their
ability to conduct themselves in accordance with their doctrines.148 In Amos,
the plaintiff had been fired from his job as a building engineer for a churchrun nonprofit because he was not a member of the Mormon Church.149 The
plaintiff argued that Section 702 violated the Establishment Clause by
advancing religion—in this case, the religion of his employer.150
Additionally, the plaintiff argued that the actions of his employer, sanctioned
by Section 702 of the Act, imposed a burden on his own religious exercise
because he was forced to choose between his employment and his beliefs.151
Thus, the case “present[ed] a confrontation between the rights of religious
organizations and those of individuals.”152
The Supreme Court sided with the employer in Amos, and dismissed the
plaintiff’s claims. In a footnote, the Court explained that because “it was the
Church . . . and not the Government, who put [the plaintiff] to the choice of
changing his religious practices or losing his job,” no violation of the
plaintiff’s Free Exercise rights had occurred.153 In other words, the Court

147. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1987).
148. Id. at 341-42 (Brennan, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 330.
150. Id. at 331. The relationship between the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses of the First Amendment is complex and is unfortunately outside the scope of this
Article.
151. See id. at 337 n.15. This argument is similar to the winning argument in Sherbert
v. Verner, where the Supreme Court held that the government had violated the Free
Exercise clause by “forc[ing the plaintiff] to choose between following the precepts of
her religion and forfeiting [unemployment] benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning
one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.” 374 U.S.
398, 404 (1963).
152. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, at 340 (Brennan, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 337 n.15.
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held that the government’s action in creating an exception to the generally
applicable Civil Rights Act was only an indirect cause of the burden on the
plaintiff’s religious freedom and was therefore insufficient government
action on which to base a First Amendment claim.154 Therefore, Amos held
that the plaintiff’s injury was not a constitutional one, and that he had no
remedy at law.
This approach to addressing conflicts between the religious freedom rights
of individuals and institutions might seem reasonable when given only
enough consideration to merit a footnote. And indeed, the Amos approach
would be reasonable in some limited contexts. For example, the result in
that case would certainly have been justified if the plaintiff had been
employed as a spiritual leader or minister for the church, rather than as a
building engineer at a church-run gymnasium open to the public.155 In fact,
courts have recognized a common law “ministerial exception” under the Free
Exercise Clause to exempt employers from otherwise generally applicable
employment laws in precisely such circumstances.156
There are significant implications raised, however, by broad application
of the Amos holding—government does not burden Free Exercise when it
enables discrimination by providing religious exemptions in otherwise
neutral antidiscrimination laws. Consider the example of Catholic hospitals,
which are a major employer and provider of healthcare in the United States.
In fact, as of 2016, one in six hospital beds in the country was in a Catholic
hospital.157 As religious entities, Catholic hospitals might claim the same
type of exemption from employment discrimination laws that was at issue in
Amos. If Catholic hospitals were to require that all of their doctors, nurses,
and other staff prove affiliation with the Catholic Church, large numbers of
healthcare workers would be faced with the same choice as the Amos
plaintiff: to change their religious practices or be out of a job.158 Still, under
154. Id. at 337.
155. See id. at 330.
156. See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2006) (describing itself

as the eighth court to adopt the ministerial exception and explaining that the exception
applies to “any claim, the resolution of which would limit a religious institution’s right
to choose who will perform particular spiritual functions”).
157. See JULIA KAYE, ET AL., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, HEALTH CARE
DENIED: PATIENTS AND PHYSICIANS SPEAK OUT ABOUT CATHOLIC HOSPITALS AND THE
THREAT TO WOMEN’S HEALTH AND LIVES 22 (2016), https://www.aclu.org/sites/
default/files/field_document/healthcaredenied.pdf.
158. This burden would fall even more heavily on doctors and hospital staff in places
where the Catholic hospital might also be the only hospital in the region. See id. at 24
(explaining that “[a]s of March 2016, there [were] 46 Catholic hospitals designated by
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Amos they would be without legal recourse.159
Under Smith, the Free Exercise Clause does not require the government to
include religious exemptions in neutral, generally-applicable laws, such as
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and other such anti-discrimination laws.160
When government nonetheless chooses to allow religious groups, non-profit
organizations, and corporations161 to be exempted from laws that otherwise
apply equally to everyone, it “privilege[s] institutional conscience over
individual conscience,” and fails to protect vulnerable individuals from
discrimination by powerful entities.162 The Free Exercise Clause was
intended to protect minority religions from the tyranny of the majority.163
When the government acts to insulate large organizations and powerful
institutions from anti-discrimination laws, it unacceptably burdens the
religious exercise of minority and non-traditional religions such as
Feminism.164
B. Conflicts Between the Free Exercise Rights of Individuals
When two individuals assert conflicting religious freedom claims, they are
the federal government as the ‘sole community hospitals’ for their geographic region”).
159. A similar type of conflict might arise if a doctor like Dr. Parker, who performs
abortions in part because of his moral convictions, were to work at a Catholic hospital.
Parker, supra note 11. Catholic hospitals operate under certain rules issued by the U.S.
Conference of Catholic Bishops, which prohibit them from providing certain services
such as abortion. See Sterling & Waters, supra note 11, at 469-70. Jessica L. Waters
writes a compelling exploration of how current “conscience-based employment
protections” might protect health care professionals who seek to provide abortions, based
on their own moral beliefs, at religiously affiliated medical institutions. See id. at 468.
The legal position of the doctors Waters describes might be strengthened by a recognition
of Feminism as a religion that espouses the moral imperative of bodily autonomy.
160. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
521 (1993); see also Emp’t Div.v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-80 (1990).
161. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014) (holding
that for-profit corporations can “exercise religion” within the meaning of RFRA).
162. See Stephens, supra note 8, at 106.
163. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (discussing protection of minority
groups from total control by the majority).
164. See Stephens, supra note 8, at 115-20. Stephans argues a similar point in her
piece on conscience exemptions for healthcare institutions and providers, specifically in
the area of reproductive healthcare. She uses vulnerability theory to argue that a
“vulnerable patient should not be forced to bear what may be significant costs of
another’s exercise of conscience.” She also proposes a more balanced approach to
conscience clauses that would better protect the rights of patients without eliminating
some reasonably tailored exemptions for providers’ religious beliefs.
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arguably on more equal footing. Again, the First Amendment is only
implicated if the government takes action. In cases involving conflicts
between individuals, the correct outcome might depend on what the
government is being asked to do. To illustrate this principle, consider the
following example, based on events that took place at a pharmacy in
Albuquerque, New Mexico.165
In June 2012, Susanne Koestner had just graduated from school with a
degree in counseling, and was preparing to start a new job.166 Because she
and her husband were not ready to have children, Ms. Koestner sought to
refill her birth control prescription at a local Walgreens pharmacy in
Albuquerque.167 However, when Ms. Koestner went to the pharmacy, she
was told by the pharmacist on duty that he would not fill her prescription due
to his religious beliefs.168 Ms. Koestner’s story is not unique; religiouslymotivated refusals by healthcare providers have been in the news in recent
years, and have been the subject of much public discussion.169
Now suppose a similar situation had happened to Ruth, a practicing
Feminist. Since Ruth believes in bodily autonomy and the right of women
to control their reproduction, her choice to prevent pregnancy through the
use of contraception would be an exercise of her religion. The scenario then
presents a conflict between Ruth’s religious exercise and the pharmacist’s
religiously-motivated refusal to serve her at his place of employment. If no
laws governed this exchange, the two parties would be at an impasse. It is
unlikely that Ruth would be able to force the pharmacist to dispense her
medication, and she would have no choice but to go elsewhere (as Ms.
Koestner and other women like her have had to do in real life).
165. See Elizabeth Chuck, Can a Pharmacist Legally Deny a Patient a Prescription?
It Depends., NBC NEWS (July 28, 2018, 8:25am), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/can-pharmacist-legally-deny-patient-prescription-it-depends-n894871.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Marie Solis, In These States, Pharmacists Can Refuse to Fill Your
Prescription for Religious Beliefs, BROADLY (June 25, 2018, 12:43pm), https://broadly.
vice.com/en_us/article/a3amzp/in-these-states-pharmacists-can-refuse-to-fill-yourprescription-for-religious-beliefs; see Monica Busch, A Michigan Pharmacist Allegedly
Denied A Woman A Miscarriage Drug On Religious Grounds, BUSTLE (Oct. 17, 2018),
https://www.bustle.com/p/a-michigan-pharmacist-allegedly-denied-a-woman-amiscarriage-drug-on-religious-grounds-12601052; Katherine Speller, Pharmacist
Allegedly Refuses to Fill A Teen’s Birth Control Prescription, BUSTLE (June 6, 2017),
https://www.bustle.com/p/pharmacist-allegedly-refuses-to-fill-a-teens-birth-controlprescription-62451.
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Of course, we live in a society of laws, which means that the government
became involved in the conflict between Ms. Koestner and the pharmacist.
Ms. Koestner filed a complaint against Walgreens under the New Mexico
Human Rights Act (NMHRA), which states that public accommodations
such as Walgreens must not discriminate on the basis of “race, religion,
color, national origin, ancestry, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity,
spousal affiliation or physical or mental handicap.”170 Ms. Koestner’s
complaint alleged that Walgreens had discriminated against her on the basis
of sex.171 However, in an identical situation, a Feminist such as Ruth could
sue the pharmacist for discriminating against her on the basis of her religion
because the pharmacist would have refused to fill her prescription based on
the understanding that Ruth would use it to engage in religious conduct to
which he objected—using birth control to prevent conception.
Because the NMHRA is a neutral law of general applicability,172 the state
would not violate the pharmacist’s Free Exercise rights by requiring him to
comply with the statutory mandate.173 If the state were to carve out an
exception to the NMHRA for the pharmacist or others like him, it would be
choosing to place its weight behind the pharmacist’s religious beliefs over
those of Ruth and others like her. The United States Supreme Court likely
would not take issue with the enactment of a religious exemption or
“conscience clause” in the NMHRA.174
However, this piece argues that in such circumstances the law should
protect Ruth and others who are asking only to be treated the same as
everyone else, rather than providing individuals like the pharmacist with
special treatment by making them above the law. This approach to such
conflicts has particular merit in circumstances such as this one, where neutral
laws of general applicability have been enacted precisely for the purpose of
ensuring equal treatment.175
170. See Chuck, supra note 165; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (2004).
171. See Chuck, supra note 165.
172. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 75 (N.M. 2013) (holding

that the NMHRA is a neutral law of general applicability).
173. In fact, several states have laws on the books that require pharmacists to provide
medication to patients, regardless of any personal objection the pharmacist might have.
See Chuck, supra note 165.
174. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 n.15 (1987). Several states already have laws that explicitly
allow pharmacists to refuse to dispense a medication based on religious reasons. See
Chuck, supra note 165.
175. See Stephens, supra note 8, at 112 (explaining that vulnerability theory focuses
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CONCLUSION
The argument put forward in this Article is in many ways more academic
than it is practical, particularly given the current political trajectory of the
courts. However, as the law recognizes more and more exceptions and
allowances for individual “morals” and “conscience,” it is imperative that
we examine whose morals we are willing to protect, and whose we are not.
In a pluralistic and dynamic society, “religious freedom” quickly becomes
oppressive when it only protects certain limited and traditional notions of
religion.
United States courts have repeatedly found that freedom of religion is one
of the most important liberty guarantees in our Constitution. They have also
found (or at least paid continuous lip-service to the idea) that individuals
practicing non-traditional and non-theistic religions are entitled to the same
protections as those practicing old, established, and “traditional” religions.
The conclusion of this article is simple: Feminists, many of whom conduct
their lives based on a comprehensive set of guiding principles and moral
imperatives, deserve the same protection for their beliefs as persons
practicing any other religion.

on the societal institutions that have been created as a response to individual
vulnerability); State Public Accommodation Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (July 13, 2016), https://perma.cc/86NK-4684. During the Civil Rights
Era, the federal government passed the Civil Rights Act, one of the first public
accommodation laws. All fifty states and the District of Columbia currently have antidiscrimination public accommodation laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, and religion, among other things. Courts have consistently held that these
statutes should be construed broadly because they are designed to have remedial effect
and to combat invidious discrimination. Id.
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